LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY, CITIZENSHIP AND PARTICIPATION IN AFRICA Ericka A. Albaugh – Working Paper – August 2015

ABSTRACT

African states are known for their linguistic dtyefsew have spread a single official language widely through their education systems. The **patise**rof many local languages seems a benefit in terms of minority rights, but some fear thegrin entation may inhibit national cohesion and democratic participation. This article examings dege competence of individuals in ten states in Africa, highlighting distinctions in types of educative states. It also assesses their attitudes about citizenship and democracy, us if no bar meter veys. It shows that immersion systems are much more effective in spreading a standard language that citizenship attitudes have very little to do with proficiency in this official language. It also as a standard with literacy in local languages tend to be more participatory, morand and greater accountability in government, and more critical of authoritarian rule.

African states are notorious for their poor education outcomes (UNESCO 2013,

"Zimbabwe" 2013, "South Africa" **20**). While virtually all have **denosa** European language as the official language of education, proficiency **escala** anguages within states across the continent is only about 20 percent on average. Certainly, there is the very few states have managed to spread a standard language through education and the state is that many local languages have been preserved; the question is what this make or citizenship and democracy.

This article will do three things: Firstvillt investigate the proficiency in European languages across the continent *itavid* highlight the factors that ake individuals more likely to speak these official languages. Second **ais** kwillow language proficiency and type of education affect citizens' national sentiments compare **de itoeth** nic attachments. Finally, it will ask how these factors affect individuals' political participation and democratic attitudes.

The findings are, unsurprisingly, that highretslepf education bring greater proficiency in European languages. Assessing diffeyreet f education, the study finds that individuals schooled in immersion versus initial mother-tongue mediatings are more likely to learn European languages. And yet, proficiency in this officing lage has ambivalent effects on individuals' sentiments toward their ethnic group and nation. National sentiment is strong within mother tongue systems as well as immersion systems ther toogue settings, we ver, citizens maintain attachments to their ethnic identity wailthe same titecaring loyalty to the nation, whereas citizens in immersion settings more readily drop the ethnic attachment. Finally, mother tongue settings appear to provide some advantages when iand nas..04e eir sentime Tw [(attach)-5.4(ments to the

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While casual observers usually equate ethnolicingaigmentation with higher violence, careful work has isolated specific configuration setting to greater conflict. Horowitz attributes greater violence potential to setting the or three large grou (p985/2000, 37-38). Bates shows that ethnic politics is most volatile when an ethnolic sufficient in size to permanently exclude others from the exercise of power (1999,e26also Collier and Hoeffler 1998). Others have focused on institutional arrangements that prove exclusive identification (Posner 2005). And what appears to be ethnic violendeelensshown instead to depend on land scarcity, interregional inequality, and the provocation provided by the state's security apparatu's Language on its own is not usually treatipalitately, with the notable exception of Laitin (2000), who found in a global sample and for entities the the distance between language families) was in fact related to violence. Language grievances, because they can be accommodated within political bargaining, seenstice inprotest, rather than violence (2000, 108). This kind of testing treats language identities these static, however, only expecting differentiation based on size and linguistic distinction among groups.

My question is more specific. I am trying to discover whether the differences in education systems – established by colonizers and largely continued through the independence period to the 90s – have had different effects on identities. Does a particular **polycyaty** use of mother tongues in education – contribute over the **termg** to the creation of insular groups with rebellious tendencies? The mechanism would **be through** become more "ideologized," in the

¹ Easterly and Levine 1997; Alesingir Basterly 1999; Collier and Gundi@99; Rodrik 1999; Keefer and Knack 2002. Even studies using more nuafraetionalization measures of that linguisticationalization (Alesieta al 2003167) and politicized ethnic diversity (Posner 2004) ghawrth. But see Habyarina, Humphreys Posner and Weinstein 2007.

words of Young (1976, 45), they would become (study) nationalist, and therefore more likely to rebel against state repression and demanduturiomy. Previous work (Albaugh 2014, Ch. 7) found that violence was tin fact more prevalent among communities in which local language education was privileged. Resonating with theolyblorowitz and Bates, violent mobilization over language has to do with the potential queent inequality that can arise if one group's language is chosen and others are not. The returns to ngue education would only contribute to conflict insofar as it reinforces the privilegepairticular group that enjoyed an early head start. Where this has occurred – Sudan, Malawi, and dutgessome extent – there have been rumblings from excluded groups. But by in large, mother tongue education has been more inclusive than exclusive, which is why it generally has not been linked to violence.

Even if scholarship has found that violent comes are only at risk where there is great intergroup inequality or permanent exclusion, ill we satt to know how education policies impact citizens' sense of national identity. Ali Mazritie abstrate the recognition of chiefdoms and native rulers in Anglophone Africa helped to increase to colonial subgroups, reducing the likelihood of an emerging national conscious in approaches to colonial rule, by being culturally relative and ethnically specific, helpeser pertuate and in some cases create the kind of ethnic consciousness which could seriously mail test nation building" (Mazrui 1983, 29). The paper will therefore look at whether this inserte attention to ethnic identity through mother tongue education indeed preventes the regence of national sentiment.

A second strand of literature includes mative and practical theories albandjuage policies in education These literatures often overlap, as empirical arguments seem to follow normative predispositions. Normatively, the quies time the goal should be uniformity or diversity. Those who advocate for uniformity argute attional unity and inclusive participation is best served when all speaks target language (Pogge 2003, Blake 2003, Archibugi 2005). Those

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who advocate for diversity argue that inclusivityes with recognition of minorities, and the imposition of a single language threatens to undermine unity (Phillipson 2008, Ives 2010, May 2012). These latter theorists similarly argue that **thesieo** method will enhance participation: namely that mother tongue education, regetifying unchosen inequalities, will allow minority voices to be heard. Practically speaking, those who advocate uniformity argue that immersion is the most efficient way for minorities to learn a commonulage, while those advocating diversity say that the use of the mother tongue is not only more inclusive, but it is more effective for teaching a second language in the long run (@calind Thomas 2004, Wong-Filmore 2004).

Of course, there is more nuance to these pos

to the majority language. This efficiency arguraent asily be reconciled with the nation-state model, but it is often rejected by purists as being "covert linguicide" (May 2012, 181). The "local language light" argument, as I call the transitiriant, has gained traction in much of Francophone Africa, while the more demanding kittprograms have been more difficult to maintain or expand, despite their apparent bestelts for learning the majority language (Heugh 2006, 69-70).

It may be that the disingenuous practice of "I

elitesparticipation, as it allowed them to joinoment or international conversations. The "masses," however, are still excluded. Alternative visions takes all able to the audience that matters. This problem is echoed more recently by lves (201160) points out that the apparently "natural" decision to learn a global language may submeic gecont sciousness and hinder the struggles of the marginalized recognize their oppression.

This article therefore will look beyond thead of mother tongue education on language acquisition, assessing its impact on citizens' attitudes and political participation.

African states are often compared unfavorably with the nation-state that arose in Europe (Herbst 2000). Whether one blames or credits date, one of its central elements was language standardization. The lack of attention to staized attention is evident in the following figure, which plots the European-language proficiency will hist ates in Africa. These are estimates based on several expert sources.

FIGURE 1

⁶ Among the general sources: A**ija**g(**b**994), Graddol (1997), Baker**Jame**s (1998), OIF (2007), Leclerc (2009-2011). Sources for individual countrie**sistee** in the appendix to Albaugh 2014.

Aside from two exceptional cases, Gabon, and Algeeiach and English retain a

therefore turned to the frobaromester veys to gauge both profinitive and possible contributing variables. These surveys ask a battery of questile 2000 to 2400 respondents from each country.

To look at individuals' actual facility in speakiunifying language, I profited in particular from one open-ended question in the 2000 baromeserveys. This question (Q88E) asked respondents to list the languages they spok Byveis aggregating the respondents by their exposure to education and their facility in a European language, one can see how effective the education system in the country has been in **its stat** of diffusing the official language. While far from perfect, the biases would be similar across all of the respondents. I coded these free responses into a 0/1 variable, 1 indicating that the respondent listed English, French, or Portuguese among the languages he or she spoke well. Though surveys are available for 20 countries, I restricted my selection to the 10 mestesentative cases for my purposes: in particular, those that education, prior to some shifts in the last decade. I also include Mozambigue as a representative of Portuguese policy, more similar to the Foramone cases in its non-use of local languages. Historically, British colonies and the independent tates that succeeded them relied on local languages in early education, while French atougu Resse colonies and second second second used these European languages from the begin pining ary school (Albaugh 2014, Ch. 2). In the last 15 years, many Francophone and Lusophone at at a shifted to the use of local languages, but adults surveyed in 2008 would have been **so thoothe original systems**: typically mother tongue for Anglophone and immersion for Francophone and Lusophone.

The following 10 countries make up the sample: Uganda, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana (Anglophone/mother tongue education); Bebirrkina Faso, Mali, Senegal (Francophone/ immersion) and Mozambique (Portuguese/immersion).

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Findings: European Language Proficiency

This finding mirrors the continual observation low literacy rate in Francophone states, and it has often led to a disparaging assess the forench system of education – the use of French rather than local languages as medium of instruction. It has probably led to these states' willingness to consider other methods. Bistritary not be the paropriate interpretation.

The Afrobarometer surveys attempt to include presentative a sample of the population in each country as possible. Because literation rates ophone Africa are much higher than in Francophone Africa (average rates among the sedivice are 76 percent versus 36 percent for the Francophone countries), a random sample twitteling capture a higher percentage of educated respondents in surveys done in Anglophone Alfinicact, the average percentage of survey respondents with some education was & Emptien Anglophone Africa versus 43 percent in Francophone Africa – twice as many respondented the had exposure to some education in the former as in the latter. We need, then, to account for level of education.

As further controls, we want to include some demographic variables. Considering the diversity of language groups in these states lit be reasonable to expect that individuals from small language groups would have more inctenteern a European language to increase their communication potential, compared with individuants large language groups, who already have more communication partners (de Swaan 2001) ulated this variable based on language size figures from Ethnologue djusting the numbers to 2010 estimation Size of Respondent's Language Group" is the portion of the country's overall potential that speaks the respondent's language as a mother tonguê It is predicted that individuals from grant indigenous groups will be less likely to need to learn a second language. I also inaclude an/rural dummy, believing that urbanization

⁹ I constructed this measubrased on data gleaned fronth from logue Language Worlde, edition (<u>www.ethnologue.co</u>), calculating group languages as a proportion of overall population (adjusting to 2010 estimates as necessary). The Afrobaeronaeguages had to bee faily matched to the Entitlogue languages, which were often named differently (this pracessible because alternate names activitis thrologue). I also aggregated languages that were split in Ethnologue, as Dogon varieties in Mali oglaarges listed as members of the Oluluyia (Luhya) macrolanguage in Kenya.

should increase one's exposure to a Europeana@em,@as should the fact of being male. Finally, I expect that young people are more likely to be learning European languages through greater interaction with media. Values for these fine/ethariables are taken from the Afrobarometer 2008 responses.

The following Logit regression results support

-2 log likelihood: 12438.371	11843.660	11269.881
** Significant at the .001 level		

Model 2 adds a dummy for type of education system – 0 for immersion and 1 for mother tongue. It indicates that mother tongue settings are lies tilded by to produce individuals who claim proficiency in a European language aniverny level of education. The following figure separates respondents by level of education to show the distinction in predicted probabilities:




FIGURE 3


Considering only the level of education and the the to solve the terms on settings, it is clear that at every level, individuals in **Eparom**e or Lusophone states are more likely to speak a European language. After two years ducation, for exampled inviduals in Anglophone states are half as likely (19%) to say they can speak Ewellsthan individuals in Francophone states to say they can speak French well (42%). The gap narrows as education increases, particularly after the fourth grade, when Anglophone estativould typically make the trainsito all English. After five years of education, individuals in Anglophone states83 percent probability of saying they speak English well, compared to 97 percent in **Grain**one or Lusophone states. Finally, with seven years of education, the probability becomes near sharthe, at 98 and 99 percent. This seems to confirm the warning that early-exit program that east effective method of imparting a second language. Model 3 adds the demographic control sming that larger-sized groups are less likely


[■]MotherTongue □Immersion

to speak a European language, while males and those in urban areas are more likely to. Age has an almost negligible effect. We can check the **rabe@iec**ts of education in each setting while

less likely a member will speak a European languagewomen from very tiny language groups have a 44 percent probability, whereas thosetheomery largest groups have only 20 percent probability. After four years of education, glap is narrower, but still pronounced: women from very tiny groups have 88 percent probability, cent probability, cent for those from the very largest groups. Above six years of schooling, the size group does not change the probability, which is about 99 percent across the board.

Comparing these findings to mother to regulecation settings, we see the same patterns, but with lower probabilities overall. With two syeareducation in mother tongue settings, rural women from tiny groups have only 17 percent probability of speaking English, and those from the very largest groups only 4 percent. After forus yeereducation, women from very small groups have 67 percent probability, compared to 31 percent groups in the very largest groups. It is only after seven years of schooling that the gap seems to shrink.





It seems evident that immersion does a better job of teaching people to speak a European language. As explained at the outset, the **remassion** remains so low in Francophone settings

is that a smaller proportion of the population **bas b** nrolled since the colonial period. Literacy

FIGURE 10

These figures show a clearly different effective at in spread of a clearly different effectives, while perhaps more effective at teaching French (even if limited in spread), seems to ask

along with urban and male categorization, in threatsion cases within Models 2 and 3. Age does not seem to play a role, and individuals fromer language groups are weakly more inclined to identify with the nation. Speaking a Europergratege, while barely significant, seems correlated with lesidentification with the nation.

The Mother Tongue education cases (highl) gbeen ave very differently. First, education

FIGURE 11

These figures and regression results point file reading role for education in each setting. Immersion systems have indeed done a bott terf \$preading a European language. And these education systems do increase individuals' naturation over their ethnic identity, but equal citizenship affording citizens conside**pabtle**ction from arbitrary state action as well as significant collective control over the personned**lecid**ions of government" (Tilly 1997, 246). In situations where 'big man rule' has become the norm, it is important to identify citizens' ability to question this patrimonialism. I selected five questions fr**&frdbe**rome**ser**vey, two pointing toward participation and three indicating demo**entaitiedes**. I discuss each briefly below and then run simple OLS regressions to see what variables correlate with these outcomes.

First, proclivity toward political participationg muibe seen in individuals' belief that they can get together to make their local assemblized endisten to their grievances (Question ²24A).

18 percent said they agreed that opposition should regularly examine and criticize government; and

21 percent said they strongly agreed patsition should examine and criticize.

The following series of OLS regressions shows association of the outcomes with the

with others to make an assemblyman listen, all of these results point to the superiority of mother tongue education settings for paraticipn and democratic attitudes.

Finally, an additional question frAfrobarometerobed respondents' sentiments about democracy (Question 40A), asking peoplectorse what they thought should be the most important national priority among several options were 1: maintaining order in the nation, 2: giving people more say in governmeistories, 3: protecting people's right to live freely, and 4: improving economic conditions for the porte following figures show the percentage of respondents in each country who chose each appriate highest national priority. The largest proportion of respondents chose "improve the ecylham the most important national priority. One might expect this to correlate with need, thioxidy GDP per capita in the year of the survey did not show a consistent pattern.

Closer to the purpose of the paper, we twaknow what proportion selected outcomes associated with democracy. Figûrelearly shows that individual the mother tongue systems are registering more interest in democration democration of respondents who want more protection of freedom is highest in Zimbaloweehaps not surprising given Zimbabwe's abysmal Freedom House score. Yet even citizens in very democratic Ghana complain about freedom at a higher rate than three of the lefes nocratic Francophone cases.

FIGURE 12

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The distinction is even more pronounced when **logatithe** percentage of citizens who want more say in their government (Fig. 13). The **chersic** cratic Anglophone cases – Ghana and Kenya – have more demands for participathoan any of the Francophone cases.

FIGURE 13

Conclusion

Scholars have long observed that British colonization left a firmer foundation for democracy (Bernard, Reenock and Nordstrom 2004; AgemJohnson and Robinson 2002; Woodberry 2012;

all following earlier theorists such as Lipsent, Seend Torres 1993). This has variously been attributed to good institutions, oggeaphy, or Protestant missions.

This paper has looked specifically at the type of education and its role in language acquisition, citizenship and democratic attitutes found that immersion settings – elitist and limited as they are – do a better job of instillineign language proficiency in school-leavers. And these schools more uniformly create citizethstroonger national versus ethnic sentiment.

Rather than creating the oppesi citizens attached more firmly (and perhaps dangerously)

Education Level	.228 (.039)	1.256	Education Level	.067 (.034)	1.070
Size 6 Language Group	· · /	.999	Size of Language Group	.006 (.002)	1.006
Rural	242 (.110)	.785	Rural	048 (.117)	.953
Female	521 (.098)	.594	Female	.101 (.104)	1.106
Do not Speak a Europ. Language	.422 (.141)	1.525	Do not Speak a Europ	385 (.134)	.680
Age	001 (.000)			(

"national identity only" because they feel that in a sense they "own" the state's national identity. Finally, the inability to speak Eng**tiskes**educe the likelihood of choosing 3, 4, or 5 in these mother tongue settings. Those unable to communication feel less attachment to the nation than their ethnic group.

May, Stephen (2012) "Language, Education and Minority Rights: Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Politics of 22 anguage,